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NOTES & COMMENT
THE CONSTITUTIONAL

GUARANTY

AGAINST

SELF INCRIMINATION:

UNITED STATES V. SULLIVAN.-United States v. Sullivan,' a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, limiting the scope of the Constitutional guaranty against self incrimination raises anew the question
as to the feasibility of the extension or restriction of the rule. While
the wording of the Constitutional provision by its terms refers only to
2
compelling a defendant to testify against himself in a criminal case,
the decisions have extended the immunity so as to protect a person
from being forced to give information which might lead to his being
prosecuted criminally.
3
Such a question arose in United States v. Lombardo, involving
4
Sec. 6 of the act dealing with the harboring of alien prostitutes,
which required of every person keeping any alien woman or girl in
a house of prostitution, or for any immoral purpose, to file with the
Commissioner General of Immigration a statement in writing setting
forth certain facts and for a failure so to file such person should
be guilty of a misdemeanor. The defendant contended that according
to this section, she was required to incriminate herself under the
5
Sustaining this contention, the court
criminal laws of Washington.
held it is beyond the power of the Congress to penalize one for
failing to render a statement which is self incriminatory, in that it

'71 L. Ed. 726 (1927).
2 U.

S.

Const.,

Fifth

Amendment:

"No

person

shall

be

*

*

*

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
'United States v. Lombardo, 228 Fed. 980 (W. D. Wash. 1915).
'White Slave Traffic Act, June 25, 1910, Chap. 395, Sec. 6.
'Secs. 2688 and 2440. Rem. & Bal. Codes of Washington.
Sec. 2440. Every person who shall place a female in the charge
or custody of another person for immoral purposes, or in a house of
prostitution with intent that she shall live a life of prostitution, or who
shall compel any female to reside with him, or with any other person for
immoral purposes, or for the purposes of prostitution or shall compel any
such female to reside in a house of prostitution, or to live a life of
prostitution * * * shall he punished by imprisonment in the state
penitentiary for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than
two thousand dollars.
Every * * * person practicing or soliciting prostituSec. 2688.
person who lives
tion, or keeping a house of prostitution, or * * *
or works in a house of prostitution or solicits for any prostitute or
house of prostitution * * * is a vagrant and shall be punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months or by a
fine of not more than five hundred dollars.
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is violative of the express provisions of the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore it is the manifest purpose of the constitutional privilege
to place the stamp of silence upon parties and witnesses, so that
the maxim of "nemo tenetur scipsuin accusare" may be kept inviolate.
In Boyd v. United States, 6 in an attempt to accuse the defendant
of fraud upon the customs revenue laws, which charge, if proved,
would ultimate in a forfeiture of his goods, 7 the government moved
to require the defendant to produce his private books, papers and
invoices.8 The Supreme Court, in this regard, ruled that a statute
which compels the compulsory production of a party's private books
and papers to be used against him in a criminal proceeding or forfeiture, was offensive to the spirit of the Fourth Amendment," because
it does not require an actual entry upon premises and a search for
and seizure of papers, to constitute an unreasonable search and
seizure. The instant case was, moreover, within the prohibition of
the Fifth Amendment for by submitting such evidence, the defendant
in effect accused himself. Consequently, the statute was declared to
be unconstitutional, and the mandate of the lower court directing the
defendant to so produce was reversed.
In United States v. Sullivan, the defendant was convicted under
an indictment which charged violation of Sec. 253 of the Revenue
Act'10 which makes a misdemeanor the failure to file an income tax
return. It appeared that in the year 1921, defendant had had a net
income in the amount of $10,000, part of which was derived from
the unlawful sale of intoxicating beverages and that he had refused
to file any return. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit," it was held that the judgment of the court below
must be reversed on the ground that Sec. 223,12 So far as it requires
a return from one whose income is derived from a violation of the
criminal law is in conflict with the Fifth Amendment.
Certiorari to review the decision was granted and the Court of
'Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.616 (1886).
"Act to Amend the Customs Revenue Laws and to Repeal Moietie.
June 22, 1874, 18 Stat. 186, § 12.
S Ibid. § 5.
'Fourth Amendment to the Constitution: The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.0
" Revenue Act of 1921, Session I, Chap. 136.
1115 Fed. (2nd) 809 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
'Supra, note 10.
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Appeals was reversed 13 upon the ground that the protection of the
Fifth Amendment was pressed too far. Mr. Justice Holmes delivering the opinion of the Court said that it might well be that the form
of the income tax return called for answers the defendant was privileged from making but as to such questions he might have raised a
specific objection. To refuse, however, to make any return at all was
not the defendant's prerogative.' 4 In this connection, the court expressed the belief that the defendant could not draw a conjurer's
circle around the whole matter by his own declaration that to write
any word upon the government blank would bring him into danger
of the law.
This decision was essential if any effect was to be given the
previous decisions holding profits resulting from illegal liquor traffic
are taxable.' 5 But there does not seem to be much relief in the suggestion that the defendant need not give all the details of his business, since almost any indication of "bootlegging" would be sufficient
to cause revenue officers to investigate defendant's movements.
On the one' hand it may be that it is more desirable to protect
the criminal from making involuntary disclosures than to eri'7rce the
"Among the arguments advanced in holding for the defendants was
that if in the case of Boyd v. U. S., supra, defendant Boyd could not
he compelled to produce his private books, papers and invoices for use in
evidence against him, a fortiori, defendant in the instant case could not
fie required to submit written statements under oath, in answer to questions on a tax return, especially when these statements disclose the commission of a crime. To make such demands of the defendant, the court
:easoned, would make him a witness against himself.
The Circuit Court, moreover, in its ruling relied to a great extent
on the cases of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892) and
Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U. S. 71 (1920). In the former, it was held
that no statute which leaves a party or witness subject to prosecution
after he answers the criminating question put to him can have the
effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the
United States.
Similarly, in the latter case, the immunity clause of § 7 of the
Bankruptcy Act (Comp. St. § 9591), to the effect that no testimony
given by a bankrupt at a meeting of creditors shall be offered in
evidence against him in any criminal proceeding, was held not to afford
a protection equivalent to that guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment,
since it does not prevent the use of his testimony to search out other
testimony to be used in evidence against himself or his property (citing
Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra).
Holding the Revenue Act of 1921 failed to furnish adequate protection against self-incrimination, the Circuit Court, in view of the
foregoing authorities, concluded that the defendant was entitled to invoke
the privilege of the Fifth Amendment.
'4 Supra, note 1.
"5 See United States v. Sischo, 262 U. S. 165 (1923).
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tax laws as applied to an illegal occupation. It has been cogently
contended, moreover, that the fear of conviction for failure to file an
income tax return would not impel a criminal to disclose the sources
of his illegal earnings,' 6 no more than the fear of conviction for "bootlegging" influences a criminal from forsaking such an employment.
On the other hand, it may be maintained in consonance with
the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, that there is no sound reason why
an individual should refrain from making an income tax report simply
because he was satisfied in the conviction that in so doing he might
incriminate himself. In other words, an individual is not to assume
functions of the court in determining whether or not the matter
would accuse him.'17 The possibility readily suggests itself, too, that
to hold otherwise would tend to foster crime in offering an attractive
refuge to lawbreakers.' s
The border line cases in the application of the provisions of the
Fifth Amendment will probably be decided according as the judges
approve or disapprove of the policy embodied in the guaranty as
applied to tax returns.
V. j. M.

QUASI-PARTNERSHIP
LIABILITY: MARTIN
V.
PEYTON - "Much
ancient learning as to partnership is obsolete." ' With these words,
the New York Court of Appeals begins its most recent decision upon
the question of when persons, not ostensibly partners, may be subjected to liability for partnership obligations.

A hundred and fifty years ago, the English Court of Common
Pleas, in the case of Grace v. Smith,2 said, "Every man who has a
share of the profits of a trade ought also to bear his share of the
loss. And if any one takes part of the profit, he takes part of that
fund on which the creditor of the trader relies for his payment." 3
Under the rule of this case, as promulgated by the English courts,
the right to share profits was decisive of partnership liability. The
"United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S. 450 (1921).
1727 Columbia Law Rev. 467 (1927); Application of rule against
Self Incrimination to Income Tax Returns.
" Mason, et al., v. United States, 244 U. S. 362 (1917).
'Martin v. Peyton, et al., 246 N. Y. 213, 217, 158 N. E. 77 (1927).
'2 W. B1. 998 (C. P. 1775).
3Ibid. 1000.

